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IN THE UTAH COURT OF AT.-; JLS 
STATE OF UTAH, s 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ! 
V • 4 
BILLY J. VIGIL, 1 
Defendant/Appellant. ! 
E Case No. 890730-CA 
i Priority Two 
B R I E F O F A P P E L L E E 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a felony in the third 
degree in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1989), 
following a jury trial in the Fifth District Court, Iron County, 
State of Utah, thte Honorable Dennis L. Draney presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 26(b)(1), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether defendant is entitled to dismissal based on 
double jeopardy grounds because, after moving for a mistrial in 
the initial trial, he was subsequently retried. The standard of 
review requires a determination of whether the trial court 
appropriately ruled that, as a matter of law, the prosecution did 
not act in bad faith or motive to provoke a more favorable second 
trial. See State v. Jones, 645 P.2d 656, 657 (Utah 1982). 
2. Whether the state met its burden of proof with 
respect to the charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. The standard of review is whether the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it support the 
verdict, State v. Heaps, 711 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985), and 
whether, as a matter of law, the weapons in defendant's 
possession constitute dangerous weapons. Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-
501 (Supp. 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
In addition to the provisions quoted throughout this 
brief, the following provisions are provided: 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-503 (Supp. 1989) (now in 1990): 
Possession of a dangerous weapon — Persons 
not permitted to have — Provisions for 
aliens — Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who is not either a 
citizen of the United States or a lawfully 
admitted alien whose business, occupation, or 
duties require the use of a dangerous weapon; 
or a lawfully admitted alien who has obtained 
a special hunting permit from the Department 
of Public Safety; or any person who has been 
convicted of any crime of violence under the 
laws of the United States, the state, or any 
other state, government, or country, or who 
is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, 
or any person who has been declared mentally 
incompetent may not own or have in his 
possession or under his custody or control 
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
The Department of Public Safety shall adopt 
rules governing the issuance and use of 
special hunting permits for lawfully admitted 
aliens. 
(b) Any person who violates this section 
if guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and if 
the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-
off shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole for a 
felony or is incarcerated at the Utah state 
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prison or other like facility may not have in 
his possession or under his custody or 
control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this 
section is guilty of a third degree felony, 
and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, 
explosive or infernal machine, he is guilty 
of a second degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-501(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) (now in 1990): 
Uniform law — Definitions . . . . 
(2) For the purpose of this part: 
(a) "Dangerous weapon11 means any item 
that in the manner of its use or intended use 
is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury. In construing whether an item, 
object or thing not commonly known as a 
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the 
character of the instrument, object or thing; 
the character of the wound produced, if any; 
and the manner in which the instrument, 
object, or thing was used are determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was initially charged with theft, possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana). The theft charge was dismissed 
after the preliminary hearing. Defendant was tried on the 
remaining two counts. The first trial# which took place on 
September 25, 1989, resulted in a mistrial following a motion by 
defendant. Defendant was retried on December 11, 1989 before the 
Honorable Dennis Draney, in Fifth District Court in Iron County. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the possession of a 
dangerous weapon charge and a verdict of not guilty on the charge 
of possession of marijuana. Defendant was sentenced on December 
11, 1989, to up to five years in the Utah State Prison. The 
sentence was ordered to run consecutively to a sentence that had 
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been previously imposed; defendant was on parole at the time this 
crime was committed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 21, 1989, two agents for Adult Probation and 
Parole were conducting business on main street in Cedar City (T. 
19). One of the agents was defendant's supervising parole agent 
(T. 19). The agents observed defendant and two others with two 
or three color televisions in the back of defendant's pickup 
truck/ which was parked in front of a pawn shop (T. 20). After 
the agents finished their business, they went to the pawn shop 
and spoke with the clerk about defendant's reason for being there 
with the television sets (T. 20). The clerk informed them that 
defendant's business with the pawn shop was legitimate, as 
defendant had purchased the televisions from the motel at which 
he worked (T. 20). The clerk then informed that agents that she 
was glad that defendant and the others had left because they were 
intoxicated (T. 20-21). 
Defendant's parole agreement prohibits him from 
consuming or possessing alcohol (T. 21). The agents went to 
defendant's apartment to investigate whether he had been 
consuming alcohol (T. 21). At first defendant denied the 
consumption of alcohol, but then admitted that he had been 
drinking (T. 21). A field intoxilyzer test confirmed defendant's 
consumption of alcohol (T. 21). 
The agents checked defendant's apartment for alcoholic 
beverages (T. 22). During the course checking the apartment, 
they located items in defendant's duffle bag (T. 22). The items 
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included two large knives, one of which was a boet knife, nun-
chucks, and a throwing star (T. 23)* They also found a knife 
under the seat of his pickup truck (T. 24) etad a fish fileting 
knife inside a tool box located in his pickup truck (T. 23-74)• 
The fish fileting knife was not admitted into evidence (T. 28). 
One of the agents located a small butt of marijuana in 
defendant's jacket pocket (T. 31-32)• 
The defense objected to the proposed testimony of two 
men, Stewart Fawcett and Alan Freeland, who would have testified 
regarding ownership of one of the knives, that the knife was 
taken without permission, that at the time defendant was seen 
taking the knife, he was angry and upset and made angry, violent 
statements (T. 38-45). Pursuant to an agreement between the 
state and the defense, the testimony was limited and submitted to 
the jury by proffer (T. 47-48). The proffer was that while 
defendant was employed at the Brianhead Motel, Mr. Freeland 
observed him place a knife (exhibit No. 1) in his belt and cover 
it with his jacket while walking out of the motel. He stated in 
an angry or upset tone that someone had taken his truck, and 
repeatedly stated that he was "sick of this" and was not "going 
to let this happen." (T. 49.) Defendant had no objection to the 
proffer in this form (T. 49). 
Agent Barton testified that the nun-chucks and throwing 
star were martial arts weapons (T. 23). Additionally Billy 
Weaver testified regarding the nature of the weapons (T. 33). 
Sheriff Weaver has twenty-one years of law enforcement experience 
(T. 33). He is the chief defensive tactics instructor for the 
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police academy in the state of Utah (T. 33). He has extensive 
background and training in the martial arts area, including the 
study of judo and karate, and he holds a fourth degree black belt 
in aikido (T. 33). He identified exhibit No. 3 as "nunchakus, •• 
which are more commonly known as nun-chucks (T. 34). Nun-chucks 
are an Okinawan karate weapon used for inflicting bodily harm or 
death (T. 34). He identified exhibit No. 4 as a "sharick," which 
is more commonly known as a throwing star (T. 34). A throwing 
star is a marshal arts weapon used for inflicting bodily harm or 
death (T. 34). Although the weapons can be used for defensive 
purposes (T. 35), they are more commonly used as offensive 
weapons (T. 37). Nun-chucks are more effective than, for 
example, a nightstick because the ropes betwecm the wooden 
handles give more leverage and speed, which metkes the striking 
power more devastating (T. 37). 
Defendant did not testify at trial. A.rehabilitation 
counselor who worked for the state testified that defendant had 
back problems, which limited his ability to work (T. 51). 
Following presentation of the evidence, the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person and not guilty of possession of a 
controlled substance (T. 57). Defendant was sentenced to up to 
five years in the Utah State Prison, to run consecutively to a 
sentence he was then serving and for which he was on parole at 
the time the crime was committed (T. 62). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The retrial of defendant is not barred based upon 
double jeopaitly grounds. On defendant's motion, the trial court 
declared a mistrial during the first trial. Defendant has not 
shown that the prosecution engaged in bad faith or motive during 
the first trial in order to provoke a more favorable second 
trial. 
The evidence at trial was sufficient to establish 
defendant's guilt of possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. Five weapons were admitted at trial; three 
knives, one of which was a boot knife, nun-chucks, and a throwing 
star. Based on the nature of the weapons, the prosecution was 
not required to prove that they iare dangerous weapons by the 
manner in which they were used. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL BASED 
ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS AFTER HAVING 
^SUCCESSFULLY MOVED FOR A MISTRIAL. 
Defendant claims that this Court should allow him to 
argue that double jeopardy provisions preclude him from being 
tried in a second proceeding once he has successfully moved for 
and obtained a mistrial in the initial proceeding. In this case, 
defendant and the prosecution stipulated to the fact that he was 
on parole at the time of this crime, which would, therefore, 
render him a "restricted person" within the meaning of the 
statute. During the course of the initial proceeding, and 
following a question by defense counsel on direct examination of 
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a witness he had called, the witness made a statement which 
referred to one of defendant's prior convictions. The following 
colloquy took place: 
MR. SHUMATE: Agent Barton, in your capacity 
as the supervising agent for Mr. Vigil, did 
you sit down and go through with him and 
explain to him the activities that he could 
and could not engage in as a parolee? 
[J. LOWE BARTON]: Yes. 
Q: And that was reduced to a written 
agreement. Is that correct? 
A: Yes, it was. 
Q: Did you ever discuss with him the size or 
number or character of knives that he could 
or could not own as a parolee? 
A: We never, as I recall, got into exact 
specifics on knives sizes. In, I don't 
recall the date, but the, the last time that 
he was convicted for a felony it was for 
possession of a straight razor. 
MR. SHUMATE: Excuse me, your Honor. [Motion 
for mistrial follows.] 
(R. 56-57.) 
The trial court granted the motion for mistrial. 
Defendant was specifically informed by the court that he would be 
subject to a new trial (R. 64). Defendant did not make a timely 
and specific objection to a new trial at that time, but instead 
defense counsel simply said that he would prepare the order for 
new trial (R. 63). 
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy 
grounds on October 6, 1989 (R. 50). The motion was denied on 
October 21, 1989 (R. 83). 
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Defendant acknowledges that Utah law currently in 
effect is dispositive on this issue (Appellant's Opening Brief at 
5). Citing to State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979) and 
State v, Jones, 645 P.2d 656 (Utah 1982), defendant acknowledges 
that the Utah case law is dispositive: If a defendant 
successfully moves for a mistrial, absent a showing a bad faith 
on the part of the prosecutor/ he has waived a claim of double 
jeopardy. However, defendant claims that the state of the law in 
Utah places an unreasonable burden on a defendant because the 
burden of establishing entitlement to a double jeopardy bar is so 
high as to render it impossible (Brief at 6). 
Defendant's argument is devoid of any legal authority 
in support of his claim of error. For this reason alone, his 
argument is without merit and should be summarily dismissed. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 
1989). 
Utah law on this issue is clear.. Defendant waived an 
argument that double jeopardy barred retrial when he successfully 
moved for a mistrial. The only exception to this waiver occurs 
when there has been prosecutorial overreaching or bad faith. 
State v. Jones, 645 P.2d 656# 657 (Utah 1982); State v. Ambrose, 
598 P.2d 354# 359 (Utah 1979). Defendant does not even attempt 
to establish that either of these criteria exist in this case. 
State v. Jones, 645 P.2d 656 (Utah 1982), is precisely 
on point. In Jonesf a witness for the prosecution, the arresting 
officer, testified that the defendant had been given Miranda 
warnings and said he did not want to make a statement. The court 
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admonished the witness, outside the presence of the jury, not to 
testify to any inculpatory statements by the defendant. The 
trial resumed, and the witness, apparently misunderstanding the 
instructions, again made the same error. The Supreme Court 
stated, "The authorities generally hold that if a defendant asks 
for a mistrial, he waives any defense he might otherwise assert 
based on double jeopardy, even though the prosecution provoked 
the error." Id. at 657. The Court found the absence of bad 
faith in the case and stated the record actually reflected good 
faith and the absence of a bad motive. Id. 
In State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 3354 (Utah 1979), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that jeopardy precludes retrial unless 
"(1) the defendant consents to the discharge, or (2) "legal 
necessity" requires the discharge in the interest of justice." 
Id. at 358 (footnote omitted). The court must carefully consider 
its ruling to discharge a jury to insure that an injustice will 
not result. The Ambrose Court cited to United States v. Jorn# 
400 U.S. 470 (1970), a case in which the United Supreme Court 
examined double jeopardy claims in the context of a defendant's 
motion for mistrial, and stated that "where circumstances develop 
not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a 
motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to 
remove any barrier to reprosecution . . . ." I^d. at 359 (quoting 
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485). 
Following Jorn, the United States Supreme Court 
reexamined and clarified its standard regarding claims of double 
jeopardy when a defendant has successfully moved for a mistrial. 
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In Orfeqon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982)f the Court articulated 
a narrow exception to the general rule, which was intended to 
resolve any eunbiguity that the Court may have suggested a broader 
rule in its prior decisions. The Court stated: 
We do not by this opinion lay down a flat 
rule that where a defendant in a criminal 
trial successfully moves for a mistrial, he 
may not thereafter invoke the bar of double 
jeopardy against a second trial. But we do 
hold that the circumstances under which such 
a defendant may invoke the bar of double 
jeopardy in a second effort to try him are 
limited to those cases in which the conduct 
giving rise to the successful motion for a 
mistrial was intended to provoke the 
defendant into moving for a mistrial. 
Id. at 679. 
Under the standard articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Kennedy/ which was decided shortly after Jones, 
defendant has not shown that the statement by Agent Barton was 
intended to provoke a motion for mistrial by defendant. Under 
the standard articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Jones and 
Ambrose, defendant has not shown that there was overreaching or 
bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the court. In fact, 
the statement was made by Agent Barlow following a question on 
direct examination by defense counsel. Defense counsel had thus 
"opened the door" and the question was not unresponsive, although 
perhaps more detailed than expected. 
Defendant's claim that he was "forced" to move for a 
mistrial is not persuasive. His claim is really no different 
than the situation in any case in which a defendant moves for a 
mistrial. A defendant, in effect, is always forced to move for a 
mistrial, and must always weigh the disadvantages of doing so 
11 
when faced with this dilemma. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 
U.S. 600, 609 (1976). 
Defendant has asked this Court to overturn, in effect, 
established precedent by the Utah Supreme Court. He has supplied 
no legal authority in support of this request, but rather claims 
that the burden of establishing bad faith is just too high and, 
therefore, unreasonable. Defendant's claim has no legal basis. 
POINT II 
THE CRIME OF POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON 
BY A RESTRICTED PERSON DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF 
OF "USE" OF THE WEAPON TO ESTABLISH THE 
CRIME; THE NATURE OF THE WEAPONS IN THIS CASE 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S 
GUILT. 
Defendant claims that the knives, throwing star, and 
nun-chucks located in his possession are not dangerous weapons 
within the meaning of the statute because the prosecution did not 
establish that defendant "used" the weapons in a dangerous way. 
The crime is "possession" of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. Defendant has not cited to even one case that 
supports his position. Because he has not offered legal support 
for his contention, this Court should summarily affirm his 
conviction. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Warehamf 772 P.2d 
960 (Utah 1989). 
The purpose of the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503, 
is to deter persons who have been convicted of violent crimes 
from thereafter possessing dangerous weapons. See State v. 
Nielsen, 544 P.2d 489, 490 (Utah 1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 
906 (1976). The critical element of the crime is that a 
restricted person "may not own or have in his possession or under 
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his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this 
part. . . ." Utah dbde Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1989). The 
statute does not contain a reference to "use" as being an element 
of the crime. 
Defendant's reference to Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-601 is 
irrelevant to the question before the court. This general 
definitions provision includes a definition of a dangerous 
weapon. The statute# however, qualifies the definitions it 
contains by stating that they apply H(u]nless otherwise 
provided. . . •" On the other hand, S 76-10-503 specifically 
provides that the definition of a dangerous weapon is defined in 
that part, part 5 o£ Chapter 10, of the Code. The relevant 
definition is contained in § 76-10-501(2)(a), which states: 
(2) For the purpose of this part: 
(a) "Dangerous weapon" means any item 
that in the manner of its use or intended use 
is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury. In construing whether an item, 
object or thing not commonly known as a 
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the 
character of the instrument, object or thing; 
*Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-601(5) (Supp. 1989): 
Unless otherwise provided, the following 
terms apply to this title: 
. . . . 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable 
of causing death or serious bodily injury, or 
a facsimile or representation of the item, 
and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended 
use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he is in 
control of such an item. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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the character of the wound produced, if any; 
and the manner in which the instrument, 
object/ or thing was used are determinative. 
(Emphasis added•) 
In this case, five weapons were found in defendant's 
possession: a large knife, m boot knife, *um-~cfaucks, and a 
throwing star in tils duffle hm§9 &md a knife under the driver's 
seat of his pickup truck (T. 22-24). Each of t&ese weapons were 
dangerous weapons because the manner of their intended use 
established that they were "capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury." An examination of the "character of the 
instrument[s]" establishes that they are dangerous weapons. Each 
of the weapons, particularly the boot knife, nun-chucks and the 
throwing star, are commonly known as dangerous weapons and, 
therefore, could be characterized as dangerous weapons per se. 
The large knife, exhibit No* 1, was taken by defendant 
from a motel at which he formerly worked. As he hid the knife in 
his belt under his jacket, he stated repeatedly in an angry, 
upset manner that someone had taken his truck, that he was "sick 
of this" and that he was not "going to let this happen" (T. 49). 
Although he did not use the knife in close proximity to these 
statements, the statements evince his intended use when taking 
the knife was not to use it for a legitimate or non-violent 
purpose. Exhibit No. 2, the boot knife, appears to have no 
legitimate purpose other than use as an offensive or defensive 
weapon; one would not ordinarily carry a knife in one's boot 
unless it were to be used as a weapon. The knife located in 
defendant's truck was found hidden under the seat. Although the 
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transcript does not reveal the precise character of the knife, 
there is no indication that it was a knife such as a pocket knife 
or kitchen knife that could have a legitimate purpose. 
The evidence established clearly that the nun-chucks 
and throwing star are dangerous weapons. Sheriff Weaver, a law 
enforcement officer with considerable expertise in this area, 
testified about the nature of these weapons. The "nunchakus" are 
an Okinawan karate weapon used to inflict bodily harm or death. 
The "sharick," or throwing star, is also a martial arts weapon 
that is used to inflict bodily harm or death (T. 34). The ropes 
between the sticks of the nun-chucks provide more leverage and 
striking power than a single stick, and the blow from nun-chucks 
can be devastating (T. 37). Both weapons are used more 
frequently for offensive than defensive purposes (T. 37). 
Some courts have distinguished between weapons that are 
"dangerous per se" and things that can by the nature of their use 
become dangerous weapons. For example, in Commonwealth v. 
Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 402 N.B.2d 1051, 1056 (1980), the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court stated: 
Courts have classified dangerous weapons into 
two categories: those dangerous per se and 
those dangerous as used. . . . A "dangerous 
weapon per seM is an instrumentality designed 
and constructed to produce death or great 
bodily harm. [Citation omitted.J Thus, for 
example, firearms, daggers, stilettos and 
brass knuckles are usually classified as 
dangerous per se, because they are designed 
for the purpose of bodily assault or defense. 
On the other hand, pocket knives, razors, 
hammers, wrenches and cutting tools are not 
so classified. [Citation omitted.] 
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In People v. Brown, 406 Mich. 215, 277 N.W.2d 155 (1979), the 
Michigan Supreme Court considered whether a machete was a 
dangerous weapon. The court stated, "It is well settled that 
some instruments such as stilettos and brass knuckles are 
dangerous weapons per sef while other instruments are not 
dangerous weapons unless used in a manner intended to inflict 
serious injury or carried for such use.*1 Jd. at 157. Under this 
criteria, at the very least the boot knife, nun-chucks and 
throwing star would be considered dangerous weapons because they 
are designed for the purpose of use as weapons. Only when the 
nature of the instrument does not establish that the weapon is a 
dangerous weapon, does the nature of the use of the weapon become 
relevant in the determination of whether it is dangerous. 
In State v. Tucker, 28 Or. App. 29, 558 P.2d 1244 
(1977), the court found that nun-chucks are dangerous weapons 
because they are primarily designed and intended for use in 
combat with the purpose of causing injury or death. The 
defendant in that case, as in this case, argued that the weapons 
can be used for recreational purposes in martial arts and, 
therefore, something more than mere possession is necessary to 
establish guilt. The court rejected the argument, stating: "By 
their very nature "martial arts," using implements in the 
demonstration, involves weaponry, and a recreational "martial 
arts" use of nunchaku sticks merely demonstrates their character 
as weapons." .Id. at 1247. 
In the present case, the nature of the weapons was 
sufficient to establish that they are dangerous weapons within 
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the meaning of Utah Code Ann. SS 76-10-503 and 501. Because they 
are commonly known as dangerous weapons, the prosecution was not 
required to establish "use" as defendant claims. Because there 
were five weapons admitted to establish a single count, any one 
of them will suffice to establish defendant's guilt. The 
evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's guilty of 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant, Billy J. Vigil, was properly convicted of 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. For the 
foregoing reasons, and any additional reasons advanced at oral 
argument, the State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
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